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Abstract
Accumulating evidence suggests that the brain can efficiently process both external and internal information. The
processing of internal information is a distinct ‘‘offline’’ cognitive mode that requires not only spontaneously generated
mental activity; it has also been hypothesized to require a decoupling of attention from perception in order to separate
competing streams of internal and external information. This process of decoupling is potentially adaptive because it could
prevent unimportant external events from disrupting an internal train of thought. Here, we use measurements of pupil
diameter (PD) to provide concrete evidence for the role of decoupling during spontaneous cognitive activity. First, during
periods conducive to offline thought but not during periods of task focus, PD exhibited spontaneous activity decoupled
from task events. Second, periods requiring external task focus were characterized by large task evoked changes in PD; in
contrast, encoding failures were preceded by episodes of high spontaneous baseline PD activity. Finally, high spontaneous
PD activity also occurred prior to only the slowest 20% of correct responses, suggesting high baseline PD indexes a distinct
mode of cognitive functioning. Together, these data are consistent with the decoupling hypothesis, which suggests that the
capacity for spontaneous cognitive activity depends upon minimizing disruptions from the external world.
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Introduction
Taking a shower, queuing for coffee, or riding the bus are all
everyday tasks with minimal cognitive demands that allow the
mind to wander [1,2]. These common experiences of dual
engagement or multi-tasking illustrate that mental activity is not
confined to the online processing of sensory information (e.g.
thoughts which are more obviously derived from an external
referent and are not especially imaginative in nature); it also has an
offline mode in which cognition is initiated spontaneously [3–5].
This offline mode is imaginative and depends more heavily on the
contents of memory than it does on concurrent perceptual
information. The fact that the offline mode persists in the face
of the distractions of the coffee queue or the bus ride raises a
question: Why isn’t spontaneous cognitive activity continually
disrupted by the information available from perception [6,7]?
One hypothesis is that the internal train of thought is not
interrupted by external events because the mind can reversibly
decouple attention from sensory information [3,8]. This ‘‘decou-
pling’’ would reduce competition between internally generated
representations (offline information) and those derived from
perception (online information) [8] by reducing the signal-to-noise
ratio of the sensory stream. Critically, decoupling could explain
our capacity for orderly, internally guided trains of thought
because it would prevent external events from interfering with
such offline cognitive processes [8].
Support for the decoupling hypothesis of spontaneous thought
comes from evidence that offline thought impairs sensory
processing [9,10] and from the well-established anti-correlation
between the so-called default-mode network (DMN) [11] and
perceptual or task relevant processes [12–14]. Moreover, recent
studies that specifically examined episodes of offline thought
indicate that both elements of the DMN and aspects of the
executive system are simultaneously active. For example, the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is recruited in a task during
periods of task-unrelated-thought (TUT) [15]. DLPFC is a brain
area known to be involved in sustaining cognition in the face of
distraction [16]. Similarly, activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (dACC) has been observed during spontaneous off-task
thought [16] and experimenter induced autobiographical planning
[17]. While it is plausible that the activation of control processes in
periods of decoupled thought indicate that these structures play a
role in the control and coordination of offline content [3], this view
has been challenged by the suggestion that such activity instead
reflects an attempt to reinstate task focus [18].
The present study tests whether the dynamics of pupil diameter
(PD) are consistent with the decoupling hypothesis. PD exhibits
rapid stimulus-evoked increases following the encoding of external
stimuli [19], increases during long term memory retrieval [20],
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as DLPFC activity) [21]. These data make PD an ideal covert
measure to assess cognitive activity during decoupled thought. In
addition, single-cell recordings in primates suggest that changes in
PD are correlated with firing rate in the brainstem locus coeruleus
(LC) [8,9], the primary source of brain norepinephrine (NE). This
correlation allows the current study to explore the potential role
that NE plays in the decoupling of attention from perception; a
role for NE in offline cognition seems plausible given the
suggestion that it has a mode of operation which facilitates task
disengagement [8,9]. As the precise mechanism by which LC-NE
influences PD is unknown, any observed association between PD
and cognitive processing should be viewed with caution.
Nonetheless, it is increasingly common to use PD as a proximal
measure of the LC-NE system [22,23].
It is important to note that it is currently unknown whether PD
(or other indirect measures of cognitive function) will exhibit
transient fluctuations that index the experience of specific periods
of spontaneous internally guided thought. The current paper, as
with other investigations of decoupling [15], assesses the offline
mode by comparing baseline activity for classes of events when
decoupling is likely to occur to events when it is less likely. We
have no way of determining moments of onset for individual
episodes of spontaneous thought. If these events occur with no
phase relationship to the task structure, trial averaging will destroy
their temporal structure and we will not be able to distinguish
these events from overall higher baseline activity.
The decoupling hypothesis assumes that the offline and online
modes of thought can be understood as different attentional states
which result from the competition of internal and external
information streams for access to a general purpose, limited
capacity attentional workspace [24,25]. The online mode occurs
when external task relevant information forms the focus of
attention; as a result internally generated information is prevented
access to the workspace. By contrast, during the offline mode,
attention to internally generated signals prevents external task
relevant information from accessing the workspace. When neuro-
cognitive changes occur in response to events in an external task,
such changes are assumed to reflect processes relevant to the task
(the online mode). On the other hand, neuro-cognitive activity
with no obvious trigger in the external environment is assumed to
reflect the processing of internally generated signals (the offline
mode).
The current paper examines whether PD exhibits these two
distinct modes of activity predicted by the decoupling hypothesis:
(i) an online mode reflecting a state of enhanced processing of external task
relevant information in which baseline PD activity is suppressed and
transient responses to external events are maximized and (ii) an
offline mode involving a state of enhanced processing of internally generated
events in which transient responses to task events are reduced and
baseline levels of PD are enhanced. To examine this hypothesis we
formulated five predictions, labeled (P1)–(P5) and summarized in
Table 1, on how the dynamics of the online/offline modes of PD
should behave.
To test these five predictions we developed two tasks (Figure 1a)
that differed primarily in the mode of cognition required for
performance. In the Working Memory (WM) task, participants
were presented with a sequence of digits and asked to retain the
identity of the most recent number in memory. The participants
responded to intermittent probes (a colored ‘‘?’’) by reporting the
parity (odd/even) of the previous number shown. The WM task
requires continuous external attention and so satisfactory task
performance demands that participants maintain an online
external focus. In the Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task, a
similar sequence of digits was observed but the intermittent probes
only required participants to report the parity of a colored number
currently displayed on the screen (see the Materials and Methods
section for further details). Hence, no encoding of the non-colored
digits was required for high levels of accuracy in the CRT task,
and in these periods participants would potentially be able to
engage the offline mode with greater frequency than in the WM
task. In our experimental paradigm, decoupling could occur in two
circumstances: (a) during the processing of the non-colored
numbers in the CRT task and (b) during ineffective processing
of the same stimuli during the WM task (i.e. slow correct responses
or encoding failures). As the ‘‘executive failure’’ view of
spontaneous thought [18] could only conceivably be applied to
the latter situation [26], common changes in PD in these two
circumstances would rule out the interpretation of spontaneous
activity as simply returning attention to the task.
Results
Experiment One used experience sampling [4] to confirm that
attention was less task-constrained during performance of the
CRT than the WM task (Figure 1b). As hypothesized from
previous work [27–29], the WM task required that participants
maintain focus on the current task environment. In the CRT task
participants were comparatively less likely to focus on the present
and instead tended to anticipate future events.
Experiment Two measured PD for participants performing both
tasks to determine (i) if the non-colored stimuli in the WM task
would evoke a transient increase in PD (P1) and (ii) if no such
increase in PD would be observed in response to these same events
in the CRT task (P2). Figure 1c presents the dynamics of PD
locked to responses (button presses); the expected increase in PD
associated with the motor response is observed in both WM and
CRT [49]. Figure 2a presents the dynamics of PD in a 2.5 second
epoch after presentation of non-colored stimuli in both tasks.
Baseline levels of PD were normalized using the 500 ms interval
prior to the non-probe stimulus. A clear evoked response was
present in the WM task and absent from the CRT task.
Experiment Two therefore confirmed our first two predictions;
in the online mode PD shows transient increases coupled to task
events (P1) and in the offline mode it does not (P2).
Given that PD activity was uncoupled to the events in the CRT
task, we next explored if the same context was accompanied by
greater spontaneous cognitive activity (P3). If this were the case,
PD should be generally larger during performance of the CRT
task than during the WM task (as shown with Experiment One).
Figure 2b demonstrates that in the 1.5 s period prior to a non-
probe stimulus, average PD in the CRT task was larger than in the
WM task.
Next, if poor external encoding is necessary for spontaneous
cognitive activity to persist (P4), high baseline PD levels should be
apparent prior to encoding failure during WM responses. PD
dynamics in the CRT task were indistinguishable prior to correct
and incorrect probes (Figure 3a). However, higher baseline PD
prior to incorrect probes was evident in the WM task. To
investigate this pre-probe difference with greater power we
performed Experiment Three, in which an additional group of
participants completed a twenty minute version of the WM task.
The data from these subjects were combined with the WM data
from the subjects in Experiment Two. Figure 3b shows PD during
the 1.5 second window prior to probes binned on subsequent
accuracy. Higher baseline PD preceded incorrectly responded
WM probes compared to correctly responded probes. Together,
Perceptual Decoupling and Offline Thought
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accompanied by a reduction in external attention (P4).
We also investigated whether periods of failed task encoding,
leading to subsequent errors, were accompanied by differences in
evoked activity in PD (P2). Figure 4 presents the dynamics of PD
in a 2.5 s epoch following the last pre-probe stimulus prior to
correctly and incorrectly responded probes in the WM task.
Baseline levels were normalized using the 500 ms interval prior to
the non-probe stimulus. While correct trials were preceded by
both a clear dilation and constriction of PD following processing of
the target stimulus, incorrect trials showed dilation following
stimulus presentation but no subsequent constriction. This analysis
confirms that the evoked response to stimuli does change when
encoding fails (P2), and in particular there is an absence of PD
constriction that accompanies normal encoding.
Finally, we investigated the relationship between baseline PD
and degree of task focus. To do so we capitalized on the fact that
response time (RT) provides a continuously varying index of the
efficiency of external attention. Assuming that offline cognition is
associated with decoupling, then large PD should be associated
with slower RT (P4). Moreover, based on brain imaging studies
suggesting that online and offline thought are discrete modes of
cognition [12], we hypothesized (P5) that the relationship between
baseline PD and probe RT should reflect this. If the online and
offline states of thought are distinct modes of cognitive operation,
the relationship between PD and RT should be highly nonlinear,
with a sharp rise in PD in a narrow transition zone between two
relatively stable states: the online mode – small PD and fast RT –
and the offline mode – slow RT and large PD. On the other hand,
if PD varies less abruptly with measures of external attention – e.g.
linearly increasing with RT – we would question the assumption of
distinct online and offline states. In this second case, attention
would smoothly switch from online to offline processing, with no
clear boundaries between the two states.
Individual subject RTs for correct WM responses in Experi-
ments Two and Three were z-transformed, pooled (Figure 5a,
main panel), and divided into five equal bins, with the bin
boundaries set using the cumulative RT distribution (Figure 5a,
inset). We then computed the mean PD for each bin in the
1.5 second interval prior to the correctly responded probe. Only
the very slowest RTs were associated with higher pre-probe
baseline PD values; no other RT bins showed significant PD
differences. This stepwise or binary relationship suggests that PD
activity does index distinct modes of cognition (P5).
Discussion
Using PD as a neurocognitive marker, we tested five predictions
derived from the decoupling hypothesis of offline thought. During
online cognition, PD showed phasic increases indicating the
processing of task stimuli (P1). In contrast, during periods
characterized by offline thought, PD either did not change in
response to external stimuli or exhibited abnormal changes (e.g.
when encoding failed) (P2) and instead showed high baseline levels
of activity decoupled from task events (P3). The same high baseline
activity observed in the easier CRT task was also seen prior to task
errors and slow responses, both of which indicate reduced
attention to perceptual stimuli (P4). Finally, the stepwise relation
between RT and PD suggested that online and offline thought
represent distinct cognitive modes (P5). Our analysis provides clear
support for the decoupling hypothesis of spontaneous thought: PD
exhibits a mode of spontaneous activity (i) uncoupled from task
events and (ii) associated with differences in the way that external
events are processed [3,6].
While other studies have indicated that offline thought leads to a
disengagement from the external world [9,10,30–33], our data are
the first to document that both perceptual coupling and
decoupling are apparent in the same neurocognitive measure in
a single paradigm. Importantly, the observation of elevated PD in
the ‘‘non-demanding’’ CRT task suggests that this activity is
involved in a process that facilitates the offline mode, rather than
reflecting an attempt to return attention to the task. Instead the
elevation in PD during the CRT task is likely to reflect this
marker’s links to known processes such as memory retrieval [20]
and/or forms of affective [34] or social cognition [35], all of which
are likely to make up some part of the offline mode [29,36,37].
Whether this decoupling represents a specific mechanism which
keeps reality separate from mental simulations [8] or arises
because of the architecture necessary for conscious thought [24]
our data cannot address. However, regardless of the mechanism,
decoupling [3,6] provides an explanation for why the internal train
of thought is not continually disrupted; the capacity to disengage
cognition from physical reality prevents spontaneously generated
mental content from being overshadowed by the continuing
stream of sensory information. Without the capacity to decouple
attention from perception, conscious thought would always be
closely tied to perceptual events and so imaginative acts would be
more difficult to engage.
Finally, it is worth speculating about the specific brain systems
involved in attentional decoupling. As the DLPFC is (i) recruited
Table 1. Five predictions derived from the decoupling hypothesis of offline thought.
Claim Prediction Experiment(s) Figure(s)
During online cognition attention is
coupled to task events
(P1) PD will increase as events in the
task are encoded
One, Two 1b, 2a, 4
During offline cognition attention is
decoupled from task events
(P2) PD will not increase when events
in the task are presented
One, Two 1b, 2a
(P3) PD will show high baseline activity
which is uncoupled from task events
One, Two 1a, 2b
Processing of spontaneously generated
mental content requires decoupling of
attention from external information
(P4) High baseline PD prior to probes
will be indicative of slow correct responses
and/or a failure to encode task events
Two, Three 3
States of on/offline cognition are distinct
modes of thought
(P5) Baseline PD will show a nonlinear or
stepwise relationship to continuous measures
of external attention
Two, Three 5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.t001
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maintenance of information in the face of distraction [16], and
(iii) associated with increases in PD [21], it is plausible that this
brain region is involved in the suppression of irrelevant external
information necessary for orderly spontaneous thought to occur.
Alternatively, given the close correlation between PD and the
dynamics of the brain LC-NE system [8,9] it is also possible that
the LC-NE system plays a role in the decoupling process. The LC-
NE system has historically been implicated in maintaining external
vigilance [7,38,39], recently it has been suggested that it helps
agents adaptively balance the need to exploit the opportunities
provided by the current environment with those associated with
other possible goal opportunities [40,41]. In the adaptive gain
theory (AGT) of NE function [40,41], the system has three distinct
firing modes, closely linked to arousal level, which actively
modulate goal pursuit [40,41]: (i) an ‘‘off’’ state of low LC activity
associated with drowsiness and inactivity, (ii) a phasic mode
characterized by transient bursts of LC activity synchronized to
task events that sustains current goal focus, and (iii) a tonic mode
involving high baseline LC activity with a relative absence of task
relevant responses that supports goal disengagement. This latter
‘tonic mode’ is typified by high baseline activity and smaller
Figure 1. Task description, experience sampling and motor-related pupil response. (a) A schematic illustrating the choice reaction time
(CRT, blue) and working memory (WM, red) tasks. In the CRT task, correct responses can be made without attention to the non-colored stimuli; this is
not true in the WM task. (b) Results of Experiment One. Thirty participants who performed above chance for both the WM and CRT tasks were
included in the analysis. Participants were asked on 18 occasions whether their attention was focused on the here and now (the task), the future, or
the past. A 263 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the experience sampling data with two factors of task [WM/CRT] and three factors of
experience [‘‘Future’’/ ‘‘Here and Now’’/ ‘‘Past’’]. This analysis indicated a Task6Experience interaction (F (2, 58)=8.51, p,.001, g
2=.23) in which
thoughts of the ‘‘Here and Now’’ were more frequent in the WM task (p,0.001) and ‘‘Future’’ thoughts more prevalent in the CRT (p,0.01). ‘‘Past’’
thoughts did not vary across tasks (p=.11). (c) Scaled pupil diameter time locked to all responses in the WM and CRT tasks. Thirteen subjects from
Experiment Two passed quality control cutoffs. Shaded regions indicate one standard error of the mean, and the response instant at t=0 is indicated
with a dashed line and arrow. In both the WM and CRT tasks the expected robust motor component [49] to pupil size is observed.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.g001
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characteristics of the ‘‘offline’’ mode presented in the current
paper. Further support for the link between the LC-NE system in
the process of decoupling comes from the observation that the
phasic mode of this system is thought to support both response
inhibition and the P3 component of the event-related potential
[42] which are characteristics of the online mode [9,43–47].
Despite the appeal of links with either the DLPFC [15] or the LC-
NE system [22,23], PD is a peripheral measure of cognition and
further work using more direct brain imaging methods are
necessary before the exact neural processes involved in decoupling
are known. Nonetheless, given the frequency of occurrence of the
offline mode in daily life [1,2,48], such future work should
consider the specific neuro-cognitive processes that ‘‘tune out’’ the
present and so underlie the capacity for the mind to wander.
Materials and Methods
This study was approved by the University of California, Santa
Barbara Psychology Ethics committee under code 09306. Written
informed consent was acquired from every participant prior to
Figure 2. Task differences in baseline and evoked PD in the
Working Memory and Choice Reaction Time tasks. (a) Thirteen
participantsfrom Experiment Two passed the quality control cut-offs and
are included in this analysis. Time courses locked to non-probe stimulus
presentation were created for each trial for each individual andeach task.
Values were averaged into ten 250 ms bins and compared using a 2610
ANOVA with factors of Task [2 levels] and Epoch [10 levels]. A significant
Task6Time interaction (F (9, 99)=3.96, p,.001, g
2=.25) indicated
differences in the pupil response to non-colored stimuli across the tasks.
No other main effects or interactions were statistically significant (all p-
values..05). Contrast analysis examining the difference between
conditions indicated the larger evoked response in the WM task
accounted for 71% of the variance (F (1, 11)=28.1, p,.001, g
2=.71).
(b) Toexaminetonicpupilsize wecomparedthemean non-baselined PD
in the1.5 seconds prior to thepresentationofnon-coloredstimuli forthe
participants in Experiment Two. An ANOVA including the task order as a
comparison revealed that PD was substantially higher in the CRT task
than in the WM task (F (1, 11)=5.48, p,.05, g
2=.38). Neither the main
effect of task order nor the interaction between task order and task was
significant (all p-values..05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.g002
Figure 3. Baseline differences in PD are larger prior to incorrect
responses to WM probes. Scaled pupil diameter prior to correct and
incorrect responses in the (a) CRT and (b) WM tasks. Thirteen
participants from Experiment Two are included in (a) and Twenty-nine
participants from Experiments Two and Three in (b). Time courses for
each trial for each subject, locked to probes, were calculated for correct
and incorrect responses for both tasks. (a) No pre-target PD differences
are evident in the CRT task, and so no additional analysis was
performed on those data. (b) For the WM task, the 1.5 s interval prior to
the probe was divided into ten 150 ms bins. Experiment number (Two/
Three) was included as a between participants variable in the ANOVA. A
main effect of accuracy (F (1, 25)=11.0, p,.005, g
2=.31) indicated that
baseline PD was higher prior to incorrect responses and there was no
effect of time, experiment, or their interaction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.g003
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Tobii 120 eye tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden) with a sampling
rate of 125 Hz. Participants were seated on a comfortable chair,
approximately half a meter from the eye tracker and did not use a
chin rest or other immobilization device. Prior to data collection
the eye tracker was calibrated to each individual using Tobii
Studio. PD was computed for each sample as follows: if
measurements from both eyes were recorded as ‘‘good’’ the two
pupil diameters were averaged. If only one eye was ‘‘good’’ that
measurement was used for PD at that time point. Any remaining
times in which both eyes were flagged as ‘‘bad’’ were linearly
interpolated. These gaps were generally short (due to either blinks
or the hooding of the eye by eyelashes), and we employed a quality
control process that rejected subjects with excessive amounts of
interpolated data. The data was then median filtered (order 5) in
order to remove spikes and low-pass filtered with a cutoff
frequency of 10 Hz. Finally, the data were z-transformed within
participants; for participants performing both CRT and WM tasks
(Experiment Two), both tasks were transformed together to retain
task differences.
Experiment One
Forty-one participants (27 females, Mean Age 18.5(2)) complet-
ed the experience sampling study.
Experiment Two
Twenty-seven healthy (17 females, Mean Age 18.6(3)) partici-
pants completed the same versions of both the CRT and WM
tasks while being eye tracked.
Experiment Three
Nineteen participants (Mean Age 19.5(3)) completed a twenty
minute version of the WM task while being eye tracked.
No participant in any Experiment had neurological or
psychiatric problems, all had normal or corrected to normal
vision, and none were color blind. Participants were tested alone in
Figure 4. Evoked changes in PD are abnormal during encoding
failures in the WM task. Scaled PD prior to correct and incorrect
responses in the WM task from Experiments 2 & 3. Twenty six
participants passed the quality control cut-offs and made one or more
mistakes in the WM task. Three participants were excluded due to PD
values greater than 3 SD above the population mean in one or more
bins, leaving a total of 23 valid cases. Time courses for each trial for each
subject, locked to pre-probe stimuli, were calculated for correct and
incorrect responses during the WM task. Values were averaged in ten
250 ms bins and compared using a 2610 ANOVA with factors of
Accuracy [2 levels] and Epoch [10 levels]. Experiment was included as a
between participants factor. This analysis yielded the expected
Accuracy X Epoch interaction (F (9, 189)=4.3, p,.01, g
2=.17). Contrast
analysis indicated that the difference in the PD dynamics between
correctly and incorrectly encoded stimuli fitted a cubic pattern that
accounted for approximately 24% of the difference in accuracy (F (1,
21)=7.4, p,.05, g
2=.24). This analysis confirms that the difference
between situations when external task relevant information was and
was not encoded can also be attributed to differences in the evoked
pupillary response (P2). No other main effect of accuracy, experiment or
their interactions reached statistical significance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.g004 Figure 5. Extremely slow response times to correct WM probes
are associated with high baseline PD. (a) Reaction times (RTs) to all
2103 correct working memory responses (Experiments Two and Three)
were within-subject z-transformed and then pooled. These RTs were
divided into five equal mass bins whose boundaries were determined
using the cumulative RT distribution (inset) and are denoted by the
colored areas in the main panel. (b) Binned, mean scaled PD for the
1.5 second window before correct WM probes, plotted against median
bin RT. ANOVA including Experiment (Two/Three) as a between-
participants variable indicated a significant effect of pupil size on
subsequent RT (F (4, 108)=7.02, p,.001, g
2=.19). No additional main
effects or interactions were significant (all p-values ..05). Post-hoc
comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) among the ANOVA results indicated
that the slowest bin differed significantly from all other bins except the
fourth bin (all corrected p-values ,.05). No other inter-bin differences
were significant (all p-values ..05).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018298.g005
Perceptual Decoupling and Offline Thought
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e18298a dim room with stable artificial lighting. Eye tracking participants
(Experiments Two and Three) with more than 40% interpolated
data were excluded, as were all participants whose accuracy was
less than 50%, representing chance in both tasks.
A schematic of the task is shown in Figure 1a. Stimuli were
presented against a white background in 40 point Arial font. Non-
probe stimuli were presented for 1000 ms followed by a fixation
cross which varied in duration from 900–2300 milliseconds (mean
duration 1500 ms). Probes (either a ‘‘?’’ during the WM task or a
colored number during the CRT task) followed between 2 and 5
black non-probe stimuli, and were presented in color (red or green,
counterbalanced across tasks and participants) to reduce percep-
tual demands of probe detection. Probes were equally likely to
follow an even or an odd digit in both tasks. Participants were
instructed to respond only to the colored events, and to use the
mouse to indicate if the number was odd (press the left button) or
even (press the right button); no responses were made to the non-
probes in either task. Task duration for all experiments was twenty
minutes; each ten minute section contained 48 probes. Task order
was counterbalanced in Experiments One and Two.
In the experience sampling study (Experiment One) all features
of the tasks were identical with the exception that 18 odd/even
probes were replaced with experience sampling probes. These
probes asked participants to indicate whether, in the period
immediately prior to the probe, they were thinking about (i) the
task/here and now, (ii) task unrelated personal events in the past,
(iii) task unrelated personal events in the future, or (iv) abstract task
unrelated thoughts with no temporal focus. Responses were
recorded using the computer keyboard.
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